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Abstract	My	paper	 aims	 at	 presenting	Peter	Auriol’s	 theory	 of	 cognition.	 Auriol	 holds	 that	 cognition	 is	“something	which	makes	 an	object	 appear	 to	 someone.”	This	 claim,	 for	Auriol,	 is	meant	 to	be	indeterminate,	as	he	explicitly	says	that	the	“something”	in	question	can	refer	to	any	type	of	being.	However,	when	he	states	how	cognition	is	“implemented”	in	cognizers,	Auriol	specifies	what	this	“something”	 is:	 for	 God,	 it	 is	 simply	 the	 deity	 itself;	 for	 creatures,	 cognition	 is	 described	 as	something	“absolute,”	i.e.	non-relational,	more	precisely	a	complex	entity	made	up	of	a	cognitive	power	 and	 a	 “likeness.”	 However,	 one	 also	 finds	 Auriol	 saying	 that	 created	 cognition,	 as	 a	“likeness,”	is	relative.	Yet,	when	Auriol	talks	of	created	cognition	as	something	relative,	he	does	not	make	an	ontological	claim:	he	means	that	one	cannot	think	of	cognition	without	thinking	of	it	as	having	a	relation	to	an	object.	In	brief,	created	cognition,	for	Auriol,	is	ontologically	absolute,	but	it	is	always	represented	together	with	a	relation.			1.	Introduction	Peter	Auriol	 is	well	 known	among	historians	of	medieval	philosophy	 for	his	 theory	of	intentionality,	and	above	all	 for	his	 idea	that	cognition	 is	directed	toward	objects	with	“intentional	being”	(esse	intentionale)	or	“apparent	being”	(esse	apparens).	Scholars	are	mostly	interested	in	the	“object-side”	of	Auriol’s	theory,	notably	in	the	exact	nature	of	this	intentional	or	apparent	being	and	in	its	relation	to	real	being.1	There	are	fewer	studies	on		1	On	Auriol’s	theory	of	intentionality,	see	notably	K.	TACHAU,	Vision	and	Certitude	in	the	Age	of	Ockham.	Optics,	
Epistemology	and	the	Foundation	of	Semantics,	1250–1345,	Leiden	1988,	pp.	85-112;	R.	PASNAU,	Theories	of	
Cognition	in	the	Later	Middle	Ages,	Cambridge	1997,	pp.	69-76;	D.	PERLER,	Theorien	der	Intentionalität	im	
Mittelalter,	Frankfurt	a.M.	22002,	pp.	255-294;	as	well	as,	more	recently,	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	“Act,	Species,	and	Appearance.	Peter	Auriol	on	 Intellectual	Cognition	and	Consciousness,”	 in:	G.	KLIMA	 (ed.),	 Intentionality,	
Cognition,	 and	 Mental	 Representation	 in	 Medieval	 Philosophy,	 New	 York	 2015,	 pp.	 141-165;	 L.	 LIČKA,	
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the	“subject-side”	of	intentionality	in	Auriol,	namely	on	the	nature	of	cognition	itself.2	In	this	paper,	I	would	like	to	explore	this	less	studied	theme,	by	focusing	on	the	problem	of	the	ontological	status	of	cognition,	concerning	which	additional	inquiries	are	needed.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	it	is	not	immediately	clear	how	Auriol’s	various	claims	on	the	topic	can	be	put	together	in	a	coherent	whole.	In	Auriol,	the	notion	of	intentional	or	apparent	being	is	also	 crucial	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 “subject-side”	 of	 intentionality.	 Indeed,	apparition	is	used	by	Auriol	to	explain	the	very	nature	of	cognition.	According	to	Auriol,	cognition	is	anything	by	means	of	which	which	an	object	appears:	as	soon	as	something	makes	 an	 object	 appear,	 this	 something	 is	 a	 cognition.	 Thus,	 what	 is	 determinate	 in	cognition	is	that	there	is	an	apparition,	but	cognition	itself	is	indeterminate,	in	the	sense	that	any	sort	of	being	can	be	a	cognition,	provided	that	an	object	appears	thanks	to	 it.	Given	 the	 indeterminacy,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 sort	 of	 “ontological	 neutrality”	 in	 this	account	 of	 cognition.	 However,	 Auriol	 does	 not	 stop	 his	 analysis	 at	 this	 level	 of	indeterminacy.	 Once	 he	 has	 made	 this	 very	 general	 claim	 about	 cognition,	 he	 brings	ontological	distinctions	back	into	play,	more	precisely	the	standard	scholastic	opposition	between	absolute	vs.	 relational	entities.	 Indeed,	according	 to	Auriol,	 cognition	must	be	“implemented,”	 i.e.	 occur	 in	 a	 form	 or	 another,	 in	 cognizers,	 and	 this	 leads	 to	 further	specifying	its	nature.	Now,	cognition	is	differently	implemented	when	it	concerns	God	and	the	creatures.	For	God,	Auriol	has	a	minimalist	account:	what	cognition	is	is	nothing	other	than	 the	 “deity”	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 an	 object	 appears	 to	 it.	 Cognition	posits	 no	 further	reality	in	God	than	the	deity	itself.	By	contrast,	for	creatures,	Auriol’s	explanation	is	harder	to	 follow.	 First,	 Auriol	 clearly	 affirms	 that	 created	 cognition	 is	 something	 “absolute,”	namely	a	complex	entity	made	up	of	a	cognitive	power	and	a	“likeness”	of	the	object,	that	is,	a	representational	means.	Then,	Auriol	introduces	a	further	complication:	he	holds	that	the	likeness	in	question	must	be	understood	as	being	related	to	the	object.	This	seems	to	imply	that	cognition	is	relative,	not	in	the	sense	that	it	is	itself	a	relation,	but	in	the	sense	that	 it	always	comes	together	with	a	relation,	or	that	a	relation	“sticks”	to	it,	so	to	say.	However,	Auriol	 is	a	conceptualist	about	relations.	Thus,	 in	the	final	analysis,	his	claim	concerning	the	relative	nature	of	cognition	does	not	mean	that	cognition	is	ontologically	
	“Perception	and	Objective	Being:	Peter	Auriol	on	Perceptual	Acts	and	their	Objects,”	in:	American	Catholic	
Philosophical	Quarterly	90	(2016),	pp.	49-76;	and	H.	T.	ADRIAENSSEN,	“Peter	Auriol	on	the	Intuitive	Cognition	of	Nonexistents,”	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Medieval	Philosophy	5	(2017),	pp.	151-180.	2	One	major	exception	is	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	“Act,	Species,	and	Appearance.	Peter	Auriol	on	Intellectual	Cognition	and	Consciousness”,	which	I	will	discuss	below.	
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relative,	but	that	one	cannot	think	of	cognition	without	thinking	of	it	as	having	a	relation	to	an	object.	In	this	paper,	I	will	enter	into	the	details	of	Auriol’s	views	on	the	nature	of	cognition,	by	carefully	presenting	one	after	the	other	the	elements	mentioned	above.	In	order	to	do	so,	 I	 will	 explain	 in	 detail	 two	 texts	 of	 Auriol.	 First,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 distinction	 35	 of	
Scriptum,	 book	 I,	 where	 Auriol	 presents	 cognition’s	 general	 ontological	 status	 and	 its	status	as	implemented,	i.e.	how	it	in	fact	occurs,	in	God	and	creatures.	Second,	I	will	turn	to	a	passage	rarely	commented	in	the	context	of	Auriol’s	theory	of	intentionality,	namely	distinction	30	of	Scriptum,	book	I,	where	the	relational	nature	of	cognition	is	discussed.	In	the	 conclusion,	 I	 will	 summarize	 and	 briefly	 evaluate	 the	 philosophical	 relevance	 of	Auriol’s	intricate	theory.			2.	Auriol	on	Cognition’s	Ontological	Status		The	longest	discussion	in	Auriol	of	cognition’s	ontological	status	is	found	in	distinction	35,	part	1,	of	the	large	and	early	version	of	his	Commentary	on	I	Sentences,	his	Scriptum.3	In	 this	 text,	 Auriol	 presents	 various	 accounts	 of	 cognition	 defended	 by	 his	contemporaries,	criticizes	all	these	accounts	and	then	introduces	his	own	comprehension	of	cognition.		Auriol	discusses	the	thesis,	defended	by	Durand	of	Saint-Pourçain,	that	intellection	is	neither	 absolute	nor	 a	 composition	of	 an	absolute	 entity	 and	a	 relation,	 but	 a	mere	relation.4	Against	this	view,	Auriol	argues	that	the	equating	of	intellection	with	a	relation	
	3	See	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	ed.	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	coll.	C.	SCHABEL	(The	Peter	Auriol	Homepage:	www.peterauriol.net),	 discussed	 in	 R.	L.	 FRIEDMAN,	 “Act,	 Species,	 and	 Appearance.	 Peter	 Auriol	 on	Intellectual	Cognition	and	Consciousness.”	4	See	DURAND	OF	ST.-POURÇAIN,	Quaestio	de	natura	cognitionis	(II	Sent.	[A]	D.	3	Q.	5)	et	Disputatio	cum	anonymo	
quodam	nec	non	Determinatio	Hervei	Natalis	O.P.	(Quol.	III	Q.	8),	ed.	J.	KOCH,	Münster	21935;	the	first	text	is	now	found	in	DURAND	OF	ST.-POURÇAIN,	Scriptum	Super	IV	libros	Sententiarum.	Dist.	1-5	libri	Secundi,	ed.	F.	RETUCCI,	Leuven	2012.	On	Durand’s	theory	of	 intentionality,	see	J.-L.	SOLÈRE,	 “Durand	of	Saint-Pourçain's	Cognition	Theory:	Its	Fundamental	Principles,”	in:	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN	–	J.-M.	COUNET	(eds.),	Medieval	Perspectives	
on	Aristotle's	De	Anima,	Leuven	/	Louvain-la-Neuve	2013,	pp.	185-248.	Durand	is	not	mentioned	by	name	in	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	but	as	established	by	Friedman,	 it	 is	clear	that	Durand	is	the	philosopher	Auriol	discusses	 here	 (see	M.	 BRÎNZEI	–	 R.	L.	 FRIEDMAN	–	C.	SCHABEL,	 “The	 Late-Medieval	 Reception	 of	 Durand’s	
Sentences	Commentary,	with	Two	Case	Studies:	Peter	Auriol	(†1322)	and	Nicholas	of	Dinkelsbühl	(†1433),”	in:	A.	SPEER	–	F.	RETUCCI	–	Th.	JESCHKE	–	G.	GULDENTOPS	(eds.),	Durand	of	Saint-Pourçain	and	His	Sentences	
Commentary.	Historical,	Philosophical,	and	Theological	Issues,	Leuven	2014,	pp.	295-341,	esp.	313-318,	as	well	as	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	“Peter	Auriol	versus	Durand	of	St.	Pourçain	on	Intellectual	Cognition”,	in:	Recherches	
de	Théologie	et	Philosophie	médiévales	(forthcoming).	
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cannot	account	for	situations	in	which	the	object,	although	appearing	to	the	cognizer,	does	not	 really	 exist.	 More	 precisely,	 he	 considers	 the	 case	 of	 an	 object	 actually	 causing	intellection,	and	wonders	whether	the	result	of	the	causation	could	be	merely	a	relation,	on	the	one	hand,	or	has	to	be	something	absolute,	on	the	other.	His	answer	is	that	if	it	were	a	relation,	the	disappearance	of	the	object	would	entail	the	disappearance	of	cognition.	Indeed,	it	is	a	standard	thesis	in	the	Middle	Ages	to	say	that	a	real	relation	cannot	exist	without	 two	 real	 relata.5	Yet,	 one	 can	 imagine	a	 situation	 in	which	 someone	 first	 sees	something	that	exists	and	that	causes	the	vision,	but	then	hallucinates	and	continues	to	see	it	even	after	it	has	disappeared.	Although	an	object	would	still	be	given	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	one	hallucinating,,	there	would	no	longer	be	a	real	object.	Thus,	the	result	of	the	object’s	causation	cannot	be	a	mere	relation,	since	such	a	relation	would	require	two	real	relata.6		When	making	 this	 claim,	 Auriol	 himself	 refers	 to	 the	 prologue	 of	 the	Scriptum,	where	 he	 develops	 similar	 arguments,	 not	 against	 Durand,	 but	 against	 Scotus.7 	More	precisely,	 Auriol	 discusses	 Scotus’	 account	 of	 “intuitive	 cognition,”	 that	 is,	 the	 type	 of	cognition	whose	objects	are	present	and	existent	and	which,	thus,	includes	perception.8	For	Scotus,	intuitive	cognition	requires	the	real	presence	and	existence	of	the	object.	By	contrast,	for	Auriol,	the	appearance	of	an	object	as	present	is	enough	and,	thus,	its	real	existence	is	not	required.	In	that	context,	an	argument	that	Auriol	attributes	to	Scotus	is	that	intuitive	cognition	is	a	relation,	and	thus	requires	two	real	relata:		No	relational	designation	can	be	posited	without	its	proper	relatum:	for	it	is	impossible	to	posit	the	Father	without	positing	the	Son.	But	an	intuitive	cognition	seems	to	be	said	denominatively	 and	 relatively,	 designating	 the	 existence	 and	 actual	 presence	 of	 its	object.	 For	when	one	 says	 I	 see	Peter,	 it	 seems	 to	 follow	 that	Therefore	Peter	 exists,	
	5	On	this	question,	see	notably	THOMAS	AQUINAS,	Summa	theologiae,	I,	13,	7,	and	M.	G.	HENNINGER,	Relations.	
Medieval	Theories	1250-1325,	Oxford	1989,	p.	7.	6	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	ed.	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	9.460-470.	In	this	paper,	when	both	pages	and	lines	are	mentioned,	they	are	separated	by	a	period,	without	the	express	references	“p.”	and	“l.”	Moreover,	unless	otherwise	specified,	all	translations	are	mine.	7	See	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	,	9.467-468,	where	he	refers	to	the	discussion	“above”	(supra)	in	which	 it	 has	been	argued	 that	 “vision	 can	 remain	 even	when	 the	 visible	 thing	disappeared”	 (“potest	manere	visio,	visibili	abscedente”).	8	JOHN	DUNS	SCOTUS,	Cuestiones	Cuodlibetales,	Quod.	VI,	§	8,	ed.	F.	ALLUNTIS,	Madrid	1968,	n°	19,	p.	213.	On	these	questions,	see	R.	CROSS,	Duns	Scotus’s	Theory	of	Cognition,	Oxford	2015,	pp.	150-170.	
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insofar	as	to	see	entails	the	existence	of	that	which	is	seen,	as	its	relatum.	Therefore,	it	is	impossible	for	an	intuitive	cognition	to	occur	without	the	object’s	being	present.9			Against	 Scotus,	 Auriol	 notably	 refers	 to	 experience:	 he	 mentions	 cases	 of	 intuitive	cognition	in	which	the	object	does	not	exist	–	most	notably	hallucinations,	but	also	other	deceptive	experiences,	such	as	dreams.10	Auriol’s	argument	is	straightforward:	in	these	cases,	intuitive	cognition	is	occurring,	but	there	is	no	real	object;	thus,	intuitive	cognition	is	 not	 a	 relation.	 Of	 course,	 one	 could	 oppose	 to	 Auriol’s	 line	 of	 argumentation	 that	someone	who	is	hallucinating	is	not	seeing	something	and	thus	is	not	having	an	intuitive	cognition.	Auriol	answers	this	objection	by	arguing	that	hallucination	is	a	case	of	vision:	when	we	say	that	someone	is	hallucinating,	or	is	“tricked,”	we	do	not	mean	that	“there	is	no	vision	in	<him>,”	but	that	“it	is	a	false	vision.”11	Another	 argument	 given	 in	 distinction	 35	 against	 the	 relational	 account	 of	intellection	is	that	cognition	must	be	“like,”	or	similar	to,	its	object,	but	that	a	relation	is	unable	to	account	for	this.	As	Auriol	puts	it,	there	must	be	some	representational	means	which	explains	cognition’s	being	similar	to	the	object,	and	this	representational	means	can	 only	 be	 something	 absolute.	 Auriol’s	 argument	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 understand,	 but	 an	attempt	to	explain	it	could	be	the	following:	cognition	is	a	representation	of	its	object;	a	relation	 taken	 as	 such	 is	 not	 a	 representation,	 but	 rather	 what	 connects	 the	representation	and	the	object;	the	representation	itself	is	one	of	the	relata	of	the	relation	and	something	absolute.12	Auriol	 also	 rejects	 three	 other	 ontological	 explanations	 of	 intellection.	 The	 first,	attributed	 to	Godfrey	of	Fontaines,	holds	 that	 intellection	 is	a	passion.	More	precisely,	according	 to	 this	 view,	 intellection	 amounts	 to	 the	 reception,	 in	 the	 intellect,	 of	 an	
	9	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	Prooemium,	sect.	2,	a.	3,	n°	74,	ed.	E.	M.	BUYTAERT,	vol.	1,	St.	Bonaventure,	New	York	1956,	197.3-10,	transl.	C.	BOLYARD	–	R.	PASNAU,	in:	R.	PASNAU	(ed.),	The	Cambridge	Translations	of	Medieval	
Philosophical	 Texts,	 Cambridge	 2002,	 pp.	 178-218,	 slightly	modified:	 “Nulla	 enim	 relativa	 demonstratio	potest	poni	absque	proprio	termino;	impossibile	est	enim	poni	Patrem	quin	Filius	ponatur.	Sed	intuitiva	notitia	videtur	denominative	et	relative	dici	ad	rei	existentiam	et	praesentiam	actualem;	nam	cum	dicitur	‘video	Petrum’,	sequi	videtur	 ‘ergo	est	Petrus’,	pro	eo	quod	 ‘videre’	 includit	esse	 illius,	quod	videtur	per	modum	termini	relativi.	Ergo	impossibile	est	intuitivam	notitiam	fieri,	nisi	re	praesente.”		10	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	Prooemium,	sect.	2,	a.	3,	n°	81-87,	ed.	E.	M.	BUYTAERT,	198.40-199.93.	11	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	Prooemium,	sect.	2,	a.	3,	n°	100,	ed.	E.	M.	BUYTAERT,	203.206-208,	transl.	C.	BOLYARD	–	R.	PASNAU:	“Cum	enim	ludificatos	dicimus	non	videre	sed	decipi,	et	videri	sibi	quod	videant,	hoc	non	dicitur	quin	in	eis	sit	visio,	sed	quia	est	visio	falsa	[…].”	For	a	presentation	of	Auriol’s	thesis	that	intuitive	cognition	is	directed	toward	objects	with	apparent	being,	and	a	defence	against	accusations	of	scepticism	made	by	Chatton	and	Wodeham,	see	H.	T.	ADRIAENSSEN,	“Peter	Auriol	on	the	Intuitive	Cognition	of	Nonexistents.”	12	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	9.429-436.	
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“intelligible	species.”	This	theory	is	inspired	by	Aristotle’s	De	anima,	where	sensation	and	intellection	are	understood	as	the	reception,	in	the	soul,	of	the	“form”	(εἶδος)	of	the	thing	without	its	matter.13	The	second	view,	attributed	to	Aquinas,	says	that	intellection	is	a	real	action,	made	on	the	basis	of	the	above	mentioned	intelligible	species.	It	is	not	clear	what	exactly	this	“action”	is	meant	to	be,	according	to	Auriol.	Maybe	he	assimilates	this	action	to	 the	 production	 of	 a	 cognitive	 means.14 	In	 such	 a	 case,	 this	 second	 view	 would	 be	inspired	by	Augustine’s	idea	that	thinking	implies	the	production	of	a	“word”	(verbum).15	The	 third	 view,	 attributed	 to	 Scotus,	 says	 that	 intellection	 is	 a	 quality,	 ontologically	distinct	from	both	the	intellective	power	itself	and	the	intelligible	species.	On	this	view,	first,	 the	 intelligible	 species	 presents	 the	 object	 to	 the	 intellective	 power;	 then,	intellection,	a	quality,	takes	place	and	the	soul	cognizes	the	object.16		Auriol	rejects	all	these	theories.	He	argues	that	cognition	is	neither	a	passion	nor	an	action.	One	of	his	arguments	is	based	on	a	careful	distinction	between	cognition	and	the	causal	processes	which	precede	it:	Auriol	invites	us	to	distinguish	between	the	reception	of	 a	 cognitive	 means,	 the	 use	 of	 a	 cognitive	 means	 to	 produce	 a	 cognition,	 and	 the	cognition	itself.	Even	if	one	admits	that	cognition	results	from	some	causal	input	or	from	some	 internal	 production,	 one	 must	 strictly	 set	 apart	 these	 processes	 and	 their	 very	result,	i.e.	the	cognizing	itself.	A	comparison	with	a	picture	helps	to	understand	Auriol’s	point:	one	has	to	distinguish	the	process	of	painting	a	picture	and	the	picture	itself;	the	representation	is	not	the	act	of	painting,	but	the	picture	itself,	which	exists	once	the	act	of	painting	 is	 achieved. 17 	This	 is	 an	 interesting	 point,	 as	 it	 shows	 that	 causality	 and	intentionality	are	strictly	distinguished	in	Auriol.	In	his	framework,	there	is	no	need	for,	say,	a	cognizer	to	have	a	causal	relation	to	an	object	in	order	to	be	intentionally	directed	toward	it,	as	the	example	of	hallucination	given	above	already	made	clear.	Besides,	in	the	cases	 where	 cognition	 is	 produced	 by	 an	 internal	 entity,	 as	 supposed	 in	 Auriol’s		13	See	GODFREY	OF	FONTAINES,	Quod.	 IV,	q.	18,	ed.	M.	DE	WULF	–	A.	PELZER,	 Louvain	1904	(quoted	 in	PETER	AURIOL,	 Scriptum,	 d.	 35,	 p.	 1,	 a.	 1,	 2.102)	 and	Quod.	 XII,	 q.	 1,	 ed.	 J.	 HOFFMANS,	 Louvain	 1932,	 as	well	 as	ARISTOTLE,	De	anima	II,	12,	424a17-24.	14	See	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	10.519-525,	as	well	as	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	9,	p.	1,	a.	1,	ed.	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	coll.	C.	SCHABEL	(The	Peter	Auriol	Homepage:	www.peterauriol.net),	4.169-184.	15	See	THOMAS	AQUINAS,	Summa	theol.,	 I,	85,	2	(quoted	 in	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	ed.	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	 3.145)	 and	De	potentia,	 8,	 1,	 ed.	P.	M.	PESSION,	 Torino	/	Roma	1965,	 as	well	 as	AUGUSTINE,	De	
Trinitate,	XV,	12,	22,	ed.	W.	J.	MOUNTAIN	(CCSL	50-50A),	Turnhout	1968,	50A,	493.87-494.96,	quoted	in	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	Intellectual	Traditions	at	the	Medieval	University.	The	Use	of	Philosophical	Psychology	in	Trinitarian	
Theology	among	the	Franciscans	and	Dominicans,	1250–1350,	Leiden	/	Boston	2013,	p.	29.	16	JOHN	DUNS	SCOTUS,	Ord.,	I,	d.	3,	Opera	Omnia,	vol.	III,	ed.	Commissio	Scotistica,	Civitas	Vaticana	1954	and	
Quod.,	q.	13,	ed.	F.	ALLUNTIS,	Madrid	1968	(both	quoted	in	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	4.191).	17	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	10.510-518.	
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distinctions	 mentioned	 right	 above,	 the	 causal	 relation	 has	 this	 internal	 entity	 as	 its	
relatum,	 but	 the	 entity	 in	 question	 is	 not	 what	 is	 thought	 of,	 that	 is,	 cognition	 is	 not	intentionally	directed	toward	it.	Another	argument	against	the	assimilation	of	cognition	to	a	passion	or	an	action	regards	God’s	cognition.	The	reception	or	 the	production	of	a	cognitive	means	 implies	some	change.	Now,	God	 is	not	 subject	 to	 change.	Thus,	one	would	have	 to	 say	 that	he	possesses	 his	 cognitive	 means	 “from	 all	 eternity”	 (ab	 aeterno)	 and	 thus	 without	 any	reception	or	production	of	the	cognitive	means	in	question.18	Against	 the	 position	 attributed	 to	 Scotus,	 Auriol	 affirms	 that	 on	 such	 a	 view,	 an	object	would	appear	twice	to	the	cognizer:	first	as	presented	by	the	intelligible	species,	and	then	as	cognized	by	intellection,	which	is	“redundant”	(superfluum)	and	“contrary	to	experience”	 (contra	 experientiam). 19 	Besides,	 in	 Scotus,	 the	 species	 is	 said	 to	 be	 a	“likeness”	 (similitudo)	of	 the	object.	Yet,	Auriol	affirms,	 following	 John	 the	Evangelist’s	authority,	as	well	as	the	claims	of	the	Ancients,	that	cognitions	are	also	likenesses.	Thus,	there	 would	 again	 be	 a	 redundancy,	 since	 one	 would	 “posit	 in	 the	 same	 power	 two	likenesses	directed	toward	the	same	object.”20	In	addition,	if	the	intelligible	species	taken	alone	is	already	presenting	an	object,	i.e.	independently	of	any	cognition,	it	would	seem	to	imply	that	objects	could	appear	to	the	mind	even	when	there	is	no	current	cognition.	Yet	this	is	absurd,	since	an	object	that	appears	necessarily	implies	a	cognition	by	means	of	which	it	appears.21	Thus,	for	Auriol,	intellection	is	neither	a	relation,	nor	a	passion,	nor	an	action,	nor	a	quality.	When	Auriol	starts	to	give	his	own	account	of	what	intellection	is,	things	become	quite	intricate.	Auriol	holds	that	the	concept	of	intellection,	or	more	broadly	of	“cognizing	in	general”	(cognoscere	 in	universali)	 is	connotative.	Connotative	concepts	refer	to	two	things,	one	“directly”	(in	recto),	as	the	concept’s	main	referent,	the	other	“obliquely”	(in	
obliquo),	 as	 that	 which	 the	 concept	 connotates.	 The	 direct	 reference	 is	 linguistically	expressed	by	a	nominative,	and	the	oblique	reference	by	what	in	Latin	grammar	is	called		18	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	10.519-525.	For	a	third	argument,	based	not	on	psychology,	but	on	hylomorphic	metaphysics,	and	that	I	pass	over	here,	see	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	11.526-533.	19	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	11.570-12.582.	20	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	12.	593-602,	as	well	as	the	reference	to	John	3:1	and	(probably)	ARISTOTLE,	De	anima,	II,	5,	418a3-6.	21	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	12.583-592.	For	another	argument	against	Scotus,	based	on	the	authority	of	Aristotle	and	Averroes,	which	holds	that	the	species	and	cognition	must	be	equated,	see	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	12.593-602.		
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an	“oblique	case,”	i.e.	all	cases	other	than	nominative.	Now,	the	concept	of	cognition	is	to	be	understood	as	“that	by	means	of	which	things	appear	to	something”	(id	quo	alicui	res	
apparent),	that	is,	to	a	cognizer.22	What	is	referred	to	obliquely,	i.e.	what	is	connotated	by	the	concept	of	cognition,	is	“determinate”	(determinatum):	it	is,	abstractly	speaking,	the	“appearance”	(apparitio	or	apparentia)	of	something	or,	concretely	speaking,	“something	to	the	extent	that	it	appears”	(aliquid	ut	apparens).	Auriol	also	talks	in	an	abstract	manner	of	what	 cognition	 is	 as	 the	 “having”	 (habitio)	 of	 an	 appearing	 object.	 Importantly,	 the	object	here	is	an	intentional	object,	since	it	has	“apparent	being.”	As	for	the	connotation	itself,	it	is	linguistically	expressed	by	an	instrumental	ablative:	cognition	is	that	“by	means	of	which	”	(quo)	things	appear.	In	contrast	with	the	connotated	item,	which	is	determinate,	what	the	concept	of	cognition	refers	to	directly	is,	according	to	Auriol,	“indeterminate”	(indeterminatum):	anything	which	makes	an	object	appear	is	a	cognition.23	As	Auriol	says:			[…]	 whatever	 it	 is	 by	 means	 of	 which	 something	 is	 had	 as	 present	 in	 the	 way	mentioned	above,	<that	is,	as	appearing,>	be	it	a	picture	on	the	wall,	a	brain	in	the	head,	a	spirit	in	the	brain,	an	icy	humour	in	the	eye,	a	species	or	anything	else,	as	soon	as	by	means	of	it	things	are	had	as	present	and	appearing,	there	is	no	doubt	that	one	would	speak	of	comprehensions	and	cognitions	of	some	type.24		In	 brief,	 “intellection	 is	 nothing	 else	 than	 that	 by	 means	 of	 which	 things	 appear	 to	something.” 25 	Thus,	 if	 Auriol	 is	 unsatisfied	 with	 the	 various	 ontological	 explanations	found	among	his	contemporaries,	it	is	above	all	because	none	of	them	focuses	on	the	“right	side”	of	cognition,	namely	on	the	object’s	being	given	to	the	cognizer.	They	all	try	to	show	that	cognition	is	a	“this”	or	a	“that”	in	the	cognizer,	but	by	doing	this	they	all	miss	the	main	point:	 appearance.	 Although	 Auriol	 gives	 arguments	 against	 each	 of	 these	 specific		22	See	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	9.424,	and	on	the	fact	that	things	appear	to	a	cognizer,	10.512-515	and	14.732-734.	Auriol	sometimes	also	says	that	things	appear	to	the	cognitive	power	(see	e.g.	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	14.729-731,	quoted	below,	fn.	31).	23	On	this	connotative	account	of	cognition,	see	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	7.316-10.506	and	13.650-15.762.	On	connotation	itself,	see	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	8,	q.	3,	a.	6,	n°	192,	ed.	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	coll.	C.	SCHABEL	 (The	 Peter	 Auriol	 Homepage:	 www.peterauriol.net),	 p.	 33,	 ed.	 E.	M.	 BUYTAERT,	 vol.	 2,	 St.	Bonaventure,	New	York	1956,	1026.49-1027.59.		24	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	8.411-414:	“[…]	quicquid	sit	illud	quo	habeatur	aliquid	praesens	per	modum	praedictum,	sive	illud	esset	pictura	in	pariete,	sive	cerebrum	in	capite,	sive	spiritus	in	cerebro,	sive	glacialis	humor	 in	oculo,	 sive	 species,	 sive	quodcumque	aliud,	dum	tamen	res	per	 illud	haberentur	praesentes	et	apparentes,	non	dubium	quod	dicerentur	comprehensiones	et	notitiae	quaedam.”		25	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	 d.	 35,	 p.	 1,	 a.	 1,	 9.425:	 “Non	enim	est	 aliud	 intellectio	quam	 id	quo	 alicui	 res	apparent	[…].”	
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ontological	accounts,	the	most	important	thing	to	say	about	cognition,	according	to	him,	is	that	cognition	implies	the	appearance	of	something	“in	front	of”	the	cognizer.	As	soon	as	there	is	something	appearing,	there	is	cognition,	no	matter	how	this	is	explained	from	an	ontological	point	of	view.	However,	 as	 Auriol	 goes	 on,	 nothing	 in	 reality	 is	 indeterminate.	 Thus,	 “it	 is	necessary,	 as	 soon	as	 intellection	 is	 said	 to	exist	 in	 the	 things,	 that	 this	 indeterminate	concept	coincides	with	a	certain	reality	of	a	determinate	nature.”26	In	other	words,	once	it	has	been	established	that	cognition	is	something	by	means	of	which	an	object	appears,	it	remains	to	be	said	what	kind	of	thing	exactly	this	indeterminate	“something”	may	be	in	various	 types	 of	 cognizers,	 that	 is,	 what	 cognition	 is	 when	 “implemented”	 in	 various	particular	cases.	It	even	holds	for	God,	although	as	regards	God,	intellection	is	simply	the	deity	itself.	Indeed,	as	Auriol	says,	in	a	minimalist	manner:			[…]	intellection	adds	nothing	directly	to	the	notion	of	deity,	neither	something	real,	nor	something	conceptual,	but	a	certain	connotated	thing,	namely	the	presentation	of	the	thing	in	apparent	being.27			Thus,	what	happens	for	God	is	that	if	you	take	deity	plus	the	appearing	of	an	object	you	have	 intellection.	 Auriol	 holds	 that	 one	 could	 “maybe”	 (forsitan)	 think	 of	 deity	 “in	 an	absolute	manner”	(absolute),	but	this	does	not	mean	that	one	could	“cut	him	off	from	the	objective	apparition”	(praescindi	ab	apparentia	obiectiva):	it	belongs	to	deity’s	“primary	concept”	(conceptus	primarius)	to	be	always	actually	intelligizing	all	beings.28	What	this	seems	 to	 mean	 is	 that	 although	 God’s	 deity	 itself	 is	 absolute,	 the	 concept	 of	 deity	 is	connotative,	since	it	also	always	obliquely	refers	to	some	appearing	objects.	As	for	creatures,	Auriol	has	a	more	complicated	story,	in	which	the	question	of	the	absolute	nature	of	cognition	plays	an	important	role.	Auriol	explicitly	defends	the	 idea	that	cognition,	when	implemented	in	creatures,	is	an	“absolute”	entity.	More	precisely,	in	creatures,	 cognition	 is	 a	 composite	 entity	 made	 up	 of	 both	 a	 cognitive	 power	 and	 a	cognitive	means	or	“likeness”	that	“informs”	the	power.	A	cognitive	power	taken	alone	
	26	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	9.428-429:	“[…]	necesse	est,	dum	intellectio	ponitur	existere	in	rerum	natura,	quod	coincidat	ille	conceptus	indeterminatus	in	aliquam	realitatem	determinatae	rationis.”	27	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	3,	24.1220-1221:	“[…]	intelligere	ad	rationem	deitatis	nihil	addat	in	recto,	nec	reale	nec	rationis,	sed	certum	connotatum,	scilicet	praesentialitatem	rei	in	esse	apparenti.”	28	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	3,	27.1395-1399	and	28.1424-1465.	
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would	 not	 be	 a	 cognition,	 i.e.	 it	 needs	 –	 say	 –	 a	 “representation”	 of	 such-and-such	 an	object;	and	a	cognitive	means	or	“likeness”	taken	alone	would	not	be	a	cognition,	since	cognition	 in	 fact	 belongs	 only	 to	 living	 beings. 29 	Thus,	 as	 stated	 by	 Auriol,	 created	intellection	 is	 something	 “absolute,”	 and	 “this	 something	 absolute	 […]	 <is>	 a	 certain	conjunction	made	up	of	the	intellective	power	and	of	the	likeness	itself.”30	Once	both	sides	of	the	concept	of	intellection	in	creatures	have	been	determined,	Auriol	summarizes	his	view	as	follows:		Intellection,	formally	and	directly	spoken	of,	in	the	created	intellect,	is	nothing	other	than	 the	 intellect	with	 a	 likeness	 of	 the	 thing	 to	 the	 extent	 that	what	 is	 posited	 in	apparent	being	appears	to	it,	hence	it	connotates	the	appearing	thing	as	appearing	to	it.31			Yet	 Auriol’s	 position	 seems	 to	 be	 problematic:	 isn’t	 the	 notion	 of	 “something	 by	means	of	which	an	object	appears”	a	relational	notion,	since	it	connects	two	items?	Once	we	allow	that	this	is	what	defines	cognition,	wouldn’t	then	cognition,	in	the	final	analysis,	be	relative?	But	then,	wouldn’t	 this	contradict	the	passages	where	Auriol	says	that	the	deity	 as	 cognizing	 is	 absolute	 and,	 still	 more	 explicitly,	 that	 created	 cognition	 is	
	29	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	9,	p.	1,	a.	1,	9.385-397	and	9.415-425,	quoted	and	discussed	in	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	“Act,	Species,	and	Appearance.	Peter	Auriol	on	Intellectual	Cognition	and	Consciousness”,	pp.	151-152	and	154.	See	also	Friedman’s	paper	for	the	importance	of	life	in	Auriol’s	theory	of	cognition.	I	pass	over	this	aspect	here.	30	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	9,	p.	1,	a.	1,	9.394-395:	“illud	absolutum	[…]	coniunctum	quoddam	ex	potentia	intellectiva	et	ex	similitudine	ipsa.”	See	also	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	8.416-10.506.	Note	that	Auriol	sometimes	talks	of	the	conjunction	in	question	in	terms	of	“the	absolute	of	intellection”	(absolutum	
intellectionis)	(see,	e.g.,	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	27,	p.	2,	a.	2,	ed.	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN	[The	Peter	Auriol	Homepage:	www.peterauriol.net],	 16.557-565,	 quoted	 in	 R.	L.	 FRIEDMAN,	 Intellectual	 Traditions	 at	 the	 Medieval	
University,	p.	586).	On	all	these	questions,	see	above	all	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	“Act,	Species,	and	Appearance.	Peter	Auriol	on	Intellectual	Cognition	and	Consciousness.”	31	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	14.729-731:	“[…]	intellectio,	 formaliter	et	 in	recto	loquendo	in	intellectu	creato,	non	est	aliud	quam	intellectus	cum	similitudine	rei,	in	quantum	id	quod	positum	est	in	esse	 apparenti	 sibi	 apparet,	 unde	 connotat	 apparens	ut	 sibi.”	As	 said	 above,	 the	distinguishing	point	 in	Auriol’s	account	of	cognition	is	the	very	idea	of	appearance.	Now,	Auriol	holds	that	the	cognitive	faculty	can	be	in	act,	and	so	that	an	“act	of	cognition”	can	exist,	but	without	anything	appearing	to	the	cognizer,	in	which	case	one	could	not	talk	of	cognition	strictly	speaking.	Auriol	distinguishes	these	two	cases	of	“cognition”	in	his	theory	of	intellection,	where	the	act	of	intellection	without	the	appearance	is	named	a	“real	intellection”;	as	for	the	act	with	the	appearance,	one	could	call	it	an	“intentional	intellection.”	These	two	kinds	of	acts,	i.e.	with	and	without	appearance,	are	used	by	Auriol	to	explain	the	distinction	between	habitual	and	occurrent	intellection.	In	what	follows,	I	will	set	this	complication	aside	and	only	treat	of	cognition	to	the	extent	that	it	 is	accompanied	by	appearance.	On	 these	questions,	 see	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	 “Act,	Species,	and	Appearance.	Peter	Auriol	on	Intellectual	Cognition	and	Consciousness,”	p.	157-165,	who	uses	the	expression	“intentional	intellection”;	the	mention	of	a	“real	intellection”	is	found	in	PETER	AURIOL,	In	II	Sent.,	d.	11,	p.	3,	q.	1,	ed.	Rome,	1605,	130bB–E,	ms.	Florence,	Biblioteca	Nazionale	Centrale,	conv.	soppr.	A.3.120,	f.	48va.	
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“absolute”?	Auriol	tackles	this	issue	by	emphasizing	the	opposition	between	connotative	and	relative	concepts.	According	 to	Auriol,	a	 relative	concept	refers	 to	 two	things,	one	“directly,”	as	the	foundation	of	the	relation,	the	other	“obliquely,”	as	the	end-point	of	the	relation.	In	other	words,	this	concept	puts	a	relation	in	a	thing,	and	connects	the	thing	to	something	 else	 via	 this	 relation.	 For	 example,	 “father”	 is	 a	 relative	 concept.	 It	 refers	directly	to	a	father,	i.e.	to	a	substance	bearing	a	relation	of	paternity,	and	obliquely	to	a	son,	 as	 that	 toward	 which	 the	 relation	 of	 paternity	 is	 pointing.	 As	 seen	 above,	 a	connotative	 concept	 also	 refers	 to	 two	 things,	 one	 directly	 and	 the	 other	 obliquely.	However,	in	contrast	to	a	relative	concept,	the	connotative	one	does	not	put	a	relation	in	the	thing	designated	directly;	rather,	it	refers	to	it	as	something	absolute.	For	example,	“flesh”	 is	a	connotative	concept.	Although	 flesh	 is	 the	 flesh	of	someone	(genitive),	 flesh	itself	is	something	absolute.32	According	to	Auriol,	this	is	exactly	what	holds	for	cognition:	it	is	“something	by	means	of	which	an	object	appears.”	Although	“by	means	of	which”	etc.	is	an	oblique	reference	to	an	object	(made	in	the	ablative),	the	“something”	in	question	is	not	 relative.	 Thus,	 saying	 that	 intellection	 is	 “something	 by	means	 of	which	 an	 object	appears”	does	not	imply	the	positing	of	a	relation	in	the	cognizer:	as	Auriol	explains	at	length,	God,	by	intelligizing,	is	not	enriched	by	a	relation.33	Similarly,	created	cognition,	even	if	it	makes	something	appear,	is	not	relative,	but	“absolute.”34	In	brief,	for	Auriol,	cognition	is	any	item	by	means	of	which	an	object	appears.	In	God,	 it	 is	 the	 deity	 itself;	 in	 creatures,	 it	 is	 a	 combination	 of	 a	 cognitive	 power	 and	 a	likeness	of	the	object.	Yet	Auriol’s	claims	about	the	absolute	nature	of	created	cognition	do	not	prevent	him	 from	saying	 that	 this	kind	of	cognition,	although	absolute	 in	 itself,	always	comes	with	a	relation.	Indeed,	during	an	analysis	of	the	notion	of	“appearing,”	in	distinction	9	of	the	Scriptum,	Auriol	affirms	that	created	intellection,	although	absolute	–	as	a	composite	entity	made	up	of	both	a	cognitive	power	and	a	cognitive	means	–,	has	two	“respects”	(habitudines)	to	its	object.35	First,	created	intellection	is	always	accompanied	by	an	action.	This	action	amounts	to	the	production	of	an	object	in	apparent	being.	Note	that	this	production,	which	concerns	cognition	“as	a	preceding	step”	(per	modum	praevii),	is	not	a	“real	action”	(actio	realis),	but	an	“intentional	action”	(actio	intentionalis),	which	
	32	See	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	8,	q.	3,	a.	6,	n°	192,	ed.	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	p.	33,	ed.	E.	M.	BUYTAERT,	1026.49-1027.59,	and	the	reference	to	ARISTOTLE,	Categories,	8a13-8b24.	33	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	3,	24.1227-26.1360.	34	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	7.320-336.	35	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	9,	p.	1,	a.	1,	10.427-12.534.	
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amounts	to	“putting	a	thing	in	apparent	being”	(ponere	res	in	esse	apparenti).36	Second,	Auriol	says	that	created	intellection	always	comes	with	a	“relation”	(relatio)	to	the	object	understood	as	the	“content”	of	cognition.	Notably	too,	distinction	9	is	not	the	only	place	in	which	such	claims	are	made.	Indeed,	in	distinction	27,	Auriol	also	holds	that	created	intellection	comes	along	with	two	“respects”	to	its	object,	one	which	is	“active”,	and	the	other	 which	 is	 “terminative.” 37 	In	 distinction	 35,	 Auriol	 briefly	 states	 why	 created	intellection	implies	a	relation:		 […]	intellection	in	creatures	implies	a	relation	of	the	measure	to	what	is	measured,	due	to	its	being	a	certain	diminished	likeness	copied	and	exemplified	from	the	object,	but	not	from	the	fact	that	it	is	that	by	means	of	which	a	thing	appears	to	the	intellect.38		Thus,	Auriol’s	thesis	is	that	created	intellection	is	relative	to	the	extent	that	it	is	made	with	the	help	of	a	cognitive	means	or	a	“likeness,”	a	reproduction	or	a	copy	of	the	object.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	this	notion	of	“likeness”	understood	as	reproduction	or	copy	is	a	relational	one.	 The	 kind	 of	 relation	 which	 is	 implied	 here	 is	 that	 “of	 the	 measure	 to	 what	 is	measured.”	This	is	a	reference	to	the	third	class	of	relations	of	Metaphysics	Δ,	15,	in	which	Aristotle	includes	cognition	and	its	objects.	According	to	Auriol,	God	does	not	intelligize	with	such	a	likeness,	i.e.	with	a	reproduction	or	a	copy	of	the	object,	since	he	is	“eminently”	(eminenter)	all	being,	so	that	it	is	rather	the	objects	which	are	reproductions	or	copies	of	him.	God	 is	not	thinking	with	a	“reproductive	 likeness,”	but	he	 is	himself	 the	“eminent	likeness”,	and	he	makes	everything	else	appear	by	simply	 turning	his	 intellectual	gaze	towards	himself.	Thus,	by	contrast	to	what	happens	with	created	intellection,	there	is	no	relation	to	be	attributed	to	God	to	the	extent	that	he	intelligizes.39			36	On	this	specific	action,	see	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1,	8.370-381,	11.554-556	and	11.564-567.	37 	PETER	 AURIOL,	 Scriptum,	 d.	 27,	 p.	 2,	 a.	 2,	 ed.	 R.	L.	 FRIEDMAN	 (The	 Peter	 Auriol	 Homepage:	www.peterauriol.net),	21.762-767.	On	these	passages	about	cognition	and	relation,	see	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	“Act,	Species,	and	Appearance.	Peter	Auriol	on	Intellectual	Cognition	and	Consciousness”,	notably	the	summary	on	p.	164.	38	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	resp.,	29.1486-1488:	“[…]	intellectio	in	creaturis	importat	relationem	mensurati	ad	mensuram,	pro	eo	quod	est	quaedam	similitudo	diminuta	transcripta	et	exemplata	ab	obiecto,	non	autem	ex	hoc	quod	est	id	quo	intellectui	res	apparet.”	For	the	background	of	the	notion	of	“diminished	likeness,”	see	A.	MAURER,	“Ens	Diminutum:	a	Note	on	its	Origin	and	Meaning,”	in:	Mediaeval	Studies	12	(1950),	pp.	216-222.	39	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1	and	resp.,	9.431.-433	and	29.1488-1490.	On	God’s	being	an	eminent	likeness	and	on	divine	cognition	as	turned	toward	God	itself,	see	notably	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	36,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN	–	L.	O.	NIELSEN	–	C.	SCHABEL	(The	Peter	Auriol	Homepage:	www.peterauriol.net).	For	a	presentation	of	Auriol’s	views	on	divine	cognition,	see	C.	SCHABEL,	Theology	at	Paris,	1316–1345.	Peter	Auriol	
and	the	Problem	of	Divine	Foreknowledge	and	Future	Contingents,	Aldershot	2000,	esp.	pp.	67-132,	and	M.	
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So,	although	Auriol	insists	on	the	thesis	that	cognition	is	not	relational,	he	seems	to	hold	that	created	cognition,	despite	its	absolute	nature,	always	comes	with	a	relation	to	an	object.	Does	Auriol	mean	that	cognition	in	creatures	is	in	fact	an	ontologically	complex	item,	namely	something	absolute,	but	to	which	a	relation	always	“sticks,”	so	the	say?	The	tricky	point,	however,	is	that	Auriol	does	not	give	relations	any	ontological	weight	of	their	own,	so	that	the	relation	added	to	created	cognition	does	not	bring	with	it	an	additional	entity.	This	point	is	explained	in	the	section	of	Scriptum,	book	I,	that	analyses	relations,	namely	 distinction	 30,	 in	 which	 Auriol	 also	 discusses	 cognition.	 This	 text	 is	 rarely	analysed	 by	 scholars	 working	 on	 Auriol’s	 theory	 of	 intentionality.	 Yet	 for	 the	understanding	of	the	relational	aspect	of	created	cognition,	it	is	the	missing	piece	of	the	puzzle.			3.	Cognition	and	Relations	in	Scriptum,	distinction	30	
	
a.	Cognition	and	“Conceptualism”	about	Relations		In	distinction	30	of	the	Scriptum,	Auriol	discusses	the	relational	nature	of	cognition,	or,	as	he	 says,	 “the	 relation	 of	 knowledge	 to	 the	 knowable,	 of	 the	 act	 of	 intellection	 to	 the	intelligible,	 or	 of	 the	 act	 of	 vision	 to	 the	 visible.”40	Cognition	 falls	 in	 the	 third	 class	 of	relations	of	Metaphysics	Δ,	15,	that	of	“the	measure	to	what	is	measured.”	It	is	relational	to	the	extent	that	it	is	made	with	the	help	of	a	cognitive	means	or	a	“likeness,”	which	is	understood	 as	 a	 reproduction	 or	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 object.	 As	Auriol	 puts	 it,	 this	 cognitive	means	can	also	be	described	as	an	“imitation”	of	the	object.41	The	idea	is	that	the	object	is	
	RENEMANN,	Gedanken	als	Wirkursachen.	Francisco	Suárez	zur	geistigen	Hervorbringung,	Amsterdam	2010,	pp.	46-48.	40	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	1,	a.	2,	ed.	Rome,	1596,	672aC,	ms.	Vat.	Borghese	lat.	329,	323rb:	“[…]	relatio	scientiae	ad	scibile,	vel	actus	intellectus	ad	intelligibile,	aut	visionis	ad	visibile	[…].”	I	compared	the	text	 of	 the	 Rome	 edition	 (=	R),	 which	 is	 not	 always	 reliable,	 with	 the	 Borghese	manuscript	 (=	B)	 and	Christopher	Schabel’s	collation	of	the	two	texts.	I	thank	Christopher	Schabel	for	having	allowed	me	to	use	his	collation	and	Heine	Hansen	for	having	provided	me	with	the	document.	Corrections	of	the	Rome	edition	are	indicated	in	angle	brackets.	41	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	1,	a.	2,	ed.	Rome,	672aB-673aF,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	lat.	329,	323rb-324ra,	notably	673aE-F,	324ra:	“[…]	mensurata	sunt	similitudines	diminutae,	et	mensurantia	<B|	R:	mensurata>	sunt	quaedam	exemplata.	Sicut	igitur	<B|	R:	ergo>	similitudo	est	inter	formas	aequales,	et	pares,	<R	add.:	et>	mutua	 indistinctio,	 sic	 inter	 formam	diminutam,	et	principalem	non	est	aliud	relatio	mensurati,	nisi	quaedam	indistinctio,	sive	<B|	R:	seu>	assimilatio,	aut	imitatio	formae	diminutae	ad	formam	exemplarem,	non	tamen	e	converso,	quia	talis	assimilatio	non	est	ex	parte	exemplaris,	propter	quod	Philosophus	dicit	in	V	 <B|	 R:	 quinto>	 Metaphysicae	 quod	 in	 talibus	 <R	 add.:	 non>	 est	 relatio	 tantum	 ex	 parte	 alterius	extremorum.”	
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the	“measure”	in	the	sense	of	a	model	or	a	standard	and	that	cognition	is	“measured”	in	the	sense	that	its	adequacy	as	an	imitation	is	evaluated	by	comparing	it	to	the	object.	As	stated	 above,	 since	 God	 does	 not	 cognize	 with	 the	 help	 of	 such	 cognitive	means,	 the	discussion	about	the	relation	of	cognition	to	its	object	does	not	pertain	to	him	but	only	to	created	cognition.42	Now,	despite	the	relational	description	of	created	cognition,	Auriol	will	 take	great	care	 to	show	that	 this	cognition	does	not	come	with	a	relation	 from	an	
ontological	point	of	view.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	Auriol	is	a	conceptualist	about	relations.43	So,	as	I	will	show,	what	he	means,	when	he	says	that	created	cognition	always	has	a	relation	to	an	object,	is	that	this	sort	of	cognition	is	always	represented	together	with	a	relation	to	an	object.	Auriol,	in	distinction	30,	holds	that	there	is	a	relation	from	cognition	to	its	object,	but	he	also	stresses	 that	 this	 relation	 is	 “only	 in	 the	mind”	 (in	 sola	apprehensione).	He	affirms	that	ontologically	speaking,	cognition	is	an	absolute	entity,	which	does	not	require	real	objects	in	order	to	exist:		 Knowledge,	with	respect	to	its	absolute	reality,	does	not	require	the	existence	of	the	knowable.44		Auriol	 explicitly	 refers	 to	 his	 previous	 arguments	 against	 the	 relational	 nature	 of	cognition	from	an	ontological	point	of	view,	namely	those	provided	in	the	prologue	of	the	
Scriptum:			 Knowledge	remains	in	the	soul	when	the	thing	is	destroyed,	nor	does	knowledge	of	the	rose	require	the	rose’s	reality	more	than	vice-versa	<i.e.	more	than	the	reality	of	the	rose	requires	knowledge	of	the	rose>.	This	is	why	many	things	are	known,	though	they	do	not	yet	exist	–	for	example,	it	is	manifest	that	the	astrologer	knows	future	eclipses	–,	and	many	things	which	have	been	and	which	do	not	exist	anymore.	Moreover,	when	the	object	disappears,	vision	could	at	least	be	preserved	in	the	eye	by	divine	power,	and	even	 by	 nature,	 as	 has	 been	 proven	 in	 the	 question	 on	 intuitive	 cognition	 in	 the	
	42	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	35,	p.	1,	a.	1	and	resp.,	9.431.-433	and	29.1488-1490.	43	See	M.	G.	HENNINGER,	Relations.	Medieval	Theories,	1250-1325,	Oxford	1989,	pp.	150-173.	44	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	 d.	 30,	 p.	 2,	 a.	 1,	 ed.	Rome,	 1596,	 696bB-C,	ms.	 Vat.	 Borghese	 lat.	 329,	 335rb:	“Scientia	quantum	ad	suam	realitatem	absolutam	non	coexigat	scibilium	entitatem.”		
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prologue.	 Again,	 it	 is	 manifest	 that	 intellection,	 which	 is	 related	 to	 the	 intelligible,	remains	when	the	intelligible	is	destroyed.45			Of	course,	Auriol	admits	that	there	are,	so	to	speak,	“standard	cases”	in	which	cognition	is	caused	 by	 a	 thing	 existing	 outside	 the	 soul,	 i.e.	 by	 something	 real. 46 	But	 as	 already	indicated	above,	causality	and	intentionality	are	not	identified	in	Auriol.	He	rather	insists	that	the	object	toward	which	cognition	is	directed	need	not	exist	in	reality.	Its	“intentional	being,”	also	called	“judged	being,”	is	enough:			 The	 objects	 of	 the	 senses,	 which	 are	 active	 and	 moving	 and	 causing	 sensations,	necessarily	have	real	being.	But	the	objects	which	are	not	efficient	but	only	terminating	and	 which	 have	 intentional	 and	 judged	 being	 need	 not	 have	 being	 <in	 the	 world>	outside,	as	has	often	been	shown	above	concerning	many	experiences.47			The	 idea,	 thus,	 is	 that	 a	 real	 relation	 requires	 two	 real	 relata,	 that	 cognition	does	not	always	 have	 a	 real	 object	 and,	 thus,	 that	 cognition	 is	 not	 ontologically	 relational.	 Its	relation	to	its	object	is	“only	in	the	mind”	(in	sola	apprehensione).	In	fact,	Auriol,	in	distinction	30	of	the	Scriptum,	not	only	shows	that	there	is	no	real	relation	between	cognition	and	objects.	His	“program,”	so	to	speak,	is	larger:	he	wants	to	show	that	no	relation	at	all	exists	in	reality.	The	strategy	that	he	adopts	is	the	following:	he	 takes,	 one	 after	 the	 other,	 the	 three	 classes	 of	 relations	 that	 Aristotle	mentions	 in	
Metaphysics	Δ,	15,	and	he	tries	to	show	that	they	all	exist	“only	in	the	mind.”	He	rejects	the	reality	of	relations	of	more	and	less,	like	being	bigger	or	smaller,	and	of	identity,	similarity,	equality,	the	reality	of	causal	relations,	and	the	reality	of	relations	between	the	“measure”	
	45	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	Rome,	696aD-E,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	lat.	329,	335ra:	“Remanet	enim	scientia	in	anima,	re	corrupta,	nec	plus	exigit	scientia	rosae	eius	realitatem	quam	econverso.	Unde	multa	sciuntur,	quae	nondum	sunt,	ut	patet	quod	astrologus	novit	futuras	eclypses,	et	multa	quae	fuerunt,	et	modo	non	sunt.	Et	iterum	<B|	R:	tamen>	visio	saltem	per	divinam	potentiam	potest	<B|	R:	poterit>	conservari	in	oculo	abeunte	obiecto.	Immo	etiam	per	naturam,	ut	supra	probatum	fuit	in	quaestione	de	notitia	intuitiva	in	prologo.	Iterum	etiam	patet	quod	intellectio,	quae	refertur	ad	intelligibile,	manet,	intelligibili	destructo.”	On	the	prologue	of	the	Scriptum,	see	the	discussion	above,	notes	9-11.	46	On	 this	 point,	 see	D.	 PERLER,	Theorien	der	 Intentionalität	 im	Mittelalter,	 p.	 272,	 quoting	PETER	AURIOL,	
Scriptum,	Prooemium,	q.	2,	a.	4,	n°	120,	ed.	E.	M.	BUYTAERT,	209.67-70.	47	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	1,	a.	3,	ed.	Rome,	687bC,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	 lat.	329,	331ra:	 “[…]	obiecta	sensuum	quae	sunt	activa	et	motiva	et	sensationes	causativa	necessario	habent	esse	reale.	Obiecta	vero	quae	 non	 sunt	 efficientia	 sed	 tantum	 terminantia	 <B|	 R:	 terminativa>	 et	 habentia	 esse	 intentionale	 et	iudicatum	 non	 oportet	 quod	 habeant	 <B|	 R:	 habeat>	 esse	 extra,	 ut	 frequenter	 supra	 ostensum	 est	 in	experientiis	multis.”	
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and	“what	is	measured,”	including	cognition	and	its	objects.48	In	other	words,	Auriol,	as	Henninger	shows,49	is	a	“conceptualist”	about	relations.	Auriol	provides	general	reasons	for	the	denial	of	the	reality	of	relations.	The	arguments	that	I	have	presented	so	far	are	directed	solely	against	the	reality	of	the	cognitive	relation:	the	relation	of	cognition	to	its	object	 cannot	 be	 real,	 since	 a	 real	 relation	 requires	 two	 real	 relata,	 whereas	 some	cognitions	are	deprived	of	a	real	object.	However,	Auriol	also	offers	arguments	against	the	reality	of	every	relation	whatsoever.	One	of	Auriol’s	claims	echoes	Physics	V,	2	(225b11-13)	and	Metaphysics	Ν,	1	(1088a23	and	1088a29-35).	In	these	texts,	Aristotle	says	that	relations	have	the	least	“being”	(ὄν),	“essence”	(οὐσία),	or	“nature”	(φύσις)	of	all	things.	One	reason	for	this	is	that	there	is	no	change	specific	to	relations,	i.e.	that	their	change	is	a	mere	“Cambridge	change”:	relations	can	appear	and	disappear	independently	of	their	bearer	undergoing	any	causal	effect.	For	example,	Socrates	can	stop	being	bigger	 than	Plato	and	start	being	smaller	than	him	without	undergoing	any	effect,	but	simply	because	the	height	of	Plato	has	increased.	For	Auriol,	such	facts	do	not	show	that	relations	have	less	reality	than	other	categories,	but	that	they	have	no	reality	at	all.50		Thus,	when	Auriol,	 in	distinction	9,	 27,	 or	35,	 says	 that	 created	 cognition,	 to	 the	extent	that	it	is	a	likeness,	i.e.	a	reproduction	or	a	copy,	is	always	related	to	an	object,	what	he	means	is	that	although	ontologically	absolute,	such	cognition	has	a	conceptual	relation	to	an	object:	 in	view	of	his	account	of	relations	 in	distinction	30,	 the	relation	between	cognition	and	its	object	cannot	exist	in	reality.51	
	48	Another	way	to	put	it	would	be	to	say	that	Auriol	rejects	the	“actuality”	of	relations,	not	their	reality,	if	by	“actuality”,	 one	 understands	 “extra-mental	 existence”,	 and	 by	 “reality”,	 the	 underlying	 essential	 or	accidental	 property	 on	 which	 relations	 are	 founded,	 e.g.	 quality	 for	 the	 relation	 of	 similarity.	 This	terminology	is	used	by	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	Intellectual	Traditions	at	the	Medieval	University,	pp.	550-563.	For	my	part,	I	will	use	the	term	“actual”	(or	rather	the	expression	“in	act”)	by	contrast	to	“potential”,	as	this	couplet	of	notions	is	used	by	Auriol	himself	in	distinction	30.	As	a	conceptualist,	Auriol,	in	this	distinction,	rejects	the	thesis	that	a	relation	is	a	“thing	existing	in	nature”	(res	in	natura	existens)	or	a	“reality”	(realitas)	(see	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	1,	a.	2,	ed.	Rome,	673bA-674bE,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	lat.	329,	324ra-vb).	However,	in	order	to	respect	authorities,	he	tries	to	make	sense	of	the	standard	medieval	distinction	between	“real	relations”	and	“relations	of	reason,”	via	the	notions	of	“actuality”	and	“potentiality”,	as	will	be	shown	below.	49	M.	G.	HENNINGER,	Relations,	pp.	150-173.	50 	See	 PETER	AURIOL,	 Scriptum,	 d.	 30,	 p.	 1,	 a.	 2,	 ed.	 Rome,	 673bA,	ms.	 Vat.	 Borgh.	 lat.	 329,	 324ra.	 For	 a	discussion	of	the	notion	of	“Cambridge	change”	in	the	context	of	the	Aristotelian	theory	of	relations,	see	M.	MIGNUCCI,	“The	Stoic	Notion	of	Relatives,”	in:	J.	BARNES	–	M.	MIGNUCCI	(eds.),	Matter	and	Metaphysics:	Fourth	
Symposium	Hellenisticum,	Naples	1988,	pp.	129-221.	One	could	object	here	that	some	relational	changes	are	real	changes,	e.g.	when	Socrates	starts	being	bigger	than	Plato	because	Socrates’	own	height	has	increased.	However,	an	answer	to	this	would	be	that	the	acquisition	of	the	relation	“being	bigger	than”	itself	is	not	a	(real)	change,	only	Plato’s	increase	of	height	is	a	(real)	change.	The	example	of	a	change	of	height	in	someone	else	 than	 the	 bearer	 of	 the	 relation	 points	 out	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 change	 of	 height	 and	 the	acquisition	of	a	relation.	51	On	this	point,	see	also	D.	PERLER,	Theorien	der	Intentionalität	im	Mittelalter,	pp.	263-266.	
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b.	Cognition	and	“Real”	Relations	However,	this	is	not	the	end	of	the	story.	In	order	to	understand	adequately	in	what	sense	created	 cognition	 is	 said	 to	 be	 relational,	 one	 needs	 to	 consider	 some	 additional	distinctions	in	Auriol’s	theory	of	relations.	I	will	present	them,	and	then	explain	how	they	apply	to	cognition.	Even	 if	 Auriol	 defends	 the	 idea	 that	 relations	 exist	 “only	 in	 the	 mind,”	 he	nevertheless	 admits	 the	 standard	 scholastic	 distinction	 between	 “real	 relations”	 and	“relations	 of	 reason.”	 Since	 all	 his	 relations	 are	 “conceptual”,	 this	 distinction	 is	 not	 a	distinction	between	real	relations	and	conceptual	relations,	as	was	normally	the	case	in	the	Middle	Ages.52	According	to	Auriol:			 […]	 a	 relation	 is	 not	 called	 “real”	 because	 it	 is	 in	 act	 in	 a	 thing,	 but	 because	 it	 is	 in	proximate	potency	in	a	thing,	so	that	the	intellect	is	forced	to	reduce	it	in	act	not	from	something	extrinsic,	but	from	the	innermost	parts	of	the	foundation.53			Auriol	 also	 says	 that	 real	 relations	 are	 those	 relations	 that	 the	 intellect	 grasps	“immediately”	(statim),	through	a	“unique	apprehension”	(unica	apprehensione),	“quasi	imperceptibly”	(quasi	imperceptibiliter),	as	if	they	were	“coming	from	the	nature	of	the	thing”	(ex	natura	rei),	or	as	if	they	were	“in	the	thing”	(in	re).	Relations	of	reason,	on	the	other	hand,	are	those	relations	that	are	not	“in	proximate	potency,”	but	which	the	intellect	“reduces	in	act	from	something	extrinsic,”	i.e.	they	do	not	seem	to	come	“from	the	nature	of	 the	 things,”	 but	 the	 intellect	 attributes	 them	–	 so	 to	 speak	–	 “mediately”	 to	 a	 thing,	because	it	grasps	this	thing	as	the	end-point	of	a	real	relation.54	For	example,	similarity	is		52 	On	 this	 distinction	 in	 Auriol,	 see	 also	 M.	G.	 HENNINGER,	 Relations,	 pp.	 166-167;	 T.	 DEWENDER,	 “Der	ontologische	Status	der	Relationen	nach	Durandus	von	St.-Pourçain,	Hervaeus	Natalis	und	Petrus	Aureoli,”	in:	S.	F.	BROWN	–	T.	DEWENDER	–	T.	KOBUSCH	 (eds.),	Philosophical	Debates	at	Paris	 in	 the	Early	Fourteenth	
Century,	Leiden	2009,	pp.	287-307,	esp.	306-307,	and	C.	GIRARD,	Le	réalisme	des	relations.	Étude	des	réponses	
apportées	au	problème	de	la	différence	entre	la	relation	et	son	fondement	(1250-1350),	PhD,	University	of	Lausanne	/	Université	Paris-Sorbonne	2015,	pp.	611-612.	53	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	Rome,	698aC-D,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	lat.	329,	336ra:	“[…]	relatio	non	dicitur	realis	ex	hoc	quod	sit	<R	add.:	in>	actu	in	re,	sed	quia	est	in	re	secundum	propinquam	potentiam,	ita	quod	cogitur	intellectus	illam	reducere	in	actum	non	ex	aliquo	extrinseco	<B|	R:	intrinseco>,	sed	ex	intimis	ipsius	fundamenti.”	Note	that	although	in	re	could	seem	here	to	mean	“in	reality,”	Auriol,	immediately	after	this	passage,	asks	whether	“being	on	the	right”	(dextrum)	is	potentially	“in	a	column”	(in	columna)	(PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	Rome,	698aD,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	lat.	329,	336ra).	54	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	Rome,	698bB-699aA,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	 lat.	329,	336rb:	 “[…]	intellectus	statim	concipit	scientiam	ut	imitativam	scibilis	(…).	Ergo	manifestum	est	quod	haec	est	ratio	<B|	
R:	rationem>	quare	relationes	debent	iudicari	reales.	(…)	intellectus	respectu	relationum	se	habet	<B|	R:	habent>	dupliciter.	Aliquando	enim	unica	apprehensione	et	quasi	imperceptibiliter	necessitatus	ex	natura	rei	reducit	eas	in	actum,	tamquam	proprios	actus	et	proprias	passiones	rerum,	et	tales	relationes	dicuntur	
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a	real	relation.	Indeed,	when	the	intellect	grasps	a	white	thing,	and	when	it	compares	that	thing	to	another	white	thing,	it	“immediately”	thinks	the	first	white	thing	as	similar	to	the	second,	and	also	the	second	as	similar	to	the	first.	A	white	thing	is	similar	to	another	white	thing	because	of	something	intrinsic	to	it,	 i.e.	because	of	its	whiteness.	Causal	relations	are	also	real.	As	soon	as	one	thinks	of	an	active	thing	as	exercising	its	power	on	a	passive	thing,	one	“immediately”	attributes	a	relation	of	cause	to	effect	to	the	active	thing,	and	also	a	relation	of	effect	to	cause	to	the	passive	thing.	An	active	thing	is	said	to	be	the	cause	of	an	effect,	and	a	passive	thing	the	effect	of	a	cause,	because	of	something	intrinsic	to	them,	i.e.	their	active	and	passive	powers.55		The	situation	is	different	with	relations	of	reason.	Relations	of	reason	are	attributed	to	a	thing	not	“immediately,”	but	rather	“mediately,”	i.e.	because	something	else	has	a	real	relation	to	them.	For	example,	“being	depicted”	(pictus),	for	Caesar,	is	a	relation	of	reason.	This	 relation	 is	 attributed	 to	 Caesar	 because	 he	 is	 the	 end-point	 of	 a	 real	 relation	belonging	 to	 something	 else,	 namely	 a	 relation	 of	 depiction	 belonging	 to	 a	 picture	 of	Caesar.56	The	intellect,	when	it	grasps	the	picture	of	Caesar	and	its	relation	of	depiction,	attributes	to	Caesar	the	relation	“being	depicted,”	but	this	relation	does	not	“come”	from	something	intrinsic	to	Caesar,	i.e.	from	some	intrinsic	feature;	rather,	it	is	attributed	to	Caesar	on	the	basis	of	an	“extrinsic”	feature,	which	is	to	be	found	in	the	picture	of	Caesar.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	what	allows	us	to	say	of	Caesar	that	he	is	a	depicted	thing	is	a	certain	disposition	of	lines	and	colours	on	a	canvas,	not	something	which	is	in	Caesar	himself.	In	sum,	Auriol	sets	up	an	opposition	between	cases	where	the	intellect	attributes	a	relation	to	something	in	virtue	of	an	intrinsic	feature	of	the	thing,	on	the	one	hand,	and	cases	where	the	intellect	attributes	a	relation	to	something	not	in	virtue	of	an	intrinsic	feature	of	the	thing,	but	because	something	else	is	related	to	this	thing,	on	the	other.	He	thinks	that	when	the	intellect	attributes	a	relation	to	something	in	virtue	of	an	intrinsic	feature	of	the	thing,	the	relation	seems	not	to	be	“fabricated”	by	the	intellect	(operari,	fabricare),	but	rather	to		reales.	 […]	 Quandoque	 vero	 non	 unica	 apprehensione	 format	 intellectus	 relationes	 circa	 res,	 nec	necessitatus	ab	ipsis	rebus	[…].	Et	tales	sunt	relationes	secundum	rationem.”	55	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	Rome,	698aF-bC,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	lat.	329,	336ra-rb:	“Similitudo	enim,	 et	 aequalitas	 reputantur	 relationes	 reales,	 similiter	 etiam	 duplicitas	 et	 subduplicitas,	 paternitas	quoque	et	filiatio.	[…]	Albedo	enim	ex	natura	rei	est	proprium	susceptibile	similitudinis,	ita	ut	appareat	ex	terminis,	 quod	 est	 in	 potentia	 propinqua	 ad	 eam.	 […]	 Similiter	 etiam	 potentia	 activa	 est	 immediatum	fundamentum,	et	susceptibile	habitudinis	principii	<B|	R:	principiis>,	quae	non	est	aliud	quam	paternitas	in	potentia	generandi.”	56	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	Rome,	698bC-E,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	 lat.	329,	336rb:	“[…]	nulla	relatio	rationis	aliter	attribuitur	rebus,	nisi	quia	<B|	R:	quod>	sunt	res	termini	aliarum	relationum.	[…]	nec	pictum	est	aliquid	fundatum	in	Caesare,	nisi	inquantum	de	eo	est	pictura.”		
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be	“found”	in	the	thing	(reperiri).	In	that	case,	the	fact	that	the	intellect	is	“fabricating”	the	relation	 is	 “hidden”	 to	 the	 intellect	 (latere).	When	 the	 intellect	 attributes	 a	 relation	 to	something	not	in	virtue	of	an	intrinsic	feature	of	the	thing,	but	because	something	else	is	related	to	this	thing,	the	fact	that	the	intellect	is	“fabricating”	the	relation	is	not	“hidden”	to	the	intellect,	i.e.	the	relation	does	not	seem	to	be	“found”	in	the	thing.57	So,	how	does	the	distinction	between	real	relations	and	relations	of	reason	apply	to	created	 cognition?	 As	 stated	 above,	 Auriol	 holds	 that	 created	 cognition	 is	 something	absolute,	 more	 precisely	 a	 combination	 of	 a	 cognitive	 power	 and	 a	 likeness	 that	reproduces	or	copies	the	object.	However,	he	also	holds	that	created	cognition,	although	absolute,	comes	with	a	relation,	due	precisely	to	its	being	a	likeness,	and	that	this	relation	falls	in	Aristotle’s	third	class	of	relations,	that	of	the	measure	and	what	is	measured.	Now,	for	Auriol,	it	seems	that	the	relation	from	cognition	to	its	object	is	“real.”	At	any	rate,	in	distinction	30,	Auriol	explicitly	says	of	“knowledge”	(scientia)	that	it	has	a	real	relation	to	its	object.58	In	fact,	following	the	standard	medieval	view,	Auriol	holds	that	the	relations,	in	Aristotle’s	third	class,	are	“non-mutual,”	i.e.	one	relation	is	real,	whereas	the	other	is	a	relation	of	reason.	As	a	consequence,	one	also	finds	Auriol	saying	that	on	the	side	of	the	object	of	knowledge,	the	relation	is	not	real,	 i.e.	 like	 in	the	case	of	“being	depicted”	for	Caesar:	“being	known”	(scitum),	for	a	stone,	is	a	relation	of	reason,	in	the	sense	that	being	known	 expresses	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 stone	 is	 the	 end-point	 toward	which	 knowledge	 is	directed.59	Once	the	 intellect	grasps	knowledge	and	 its	relation	to	a	stone,	 it	attributes	“being	known”	to	the	stone,	but	“being	known”	does	not	“come”	from	an	intrinsic	feature	of	 the	stone.	Can	these	claims	be	extended	to	cognition	 in	general?	Although	Auriol,	 in	distinction	30,	does	not	explicitly	say	that	the	relations	between	intellection	or	perception	and	their	objects	are	to	be	counted	among	non-mutual	ones,	it	is	likely	that	he	defends	the	view.	Indeed,	he	treats	intellection	and	perception	on	a	par	with	knowledge	in	distinction	30,	as	belonging	to	Aristotle’s	third	class	of	relations,	which	are	non-mutual.60	Thus,	one	may	 say	 that	 for	 Auriol,	 “cognizing”	 in	 general	 always	 comes	 with	 a	 “real	 relation,”	whereas	 “being	 cognized”	 is	 a	 relation	of	 reason.	 In	Auriol’s	 framework,	 this	does	not		57	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	Rome,	698bF-699aA,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	lat.	329,	336rb-va.	58	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	Rome,	698bB-C,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	lat.	329,	336rb,	quoted	above,	note	54.	59	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	2,	a.	1,	ed.	Rome,	698bB-E,	ms.	Vat.	Borgh.	lat.	329,	336rb.	On	non-mutual	relations,	see	notably	M.	G.	HENNINGER,	Relations,	pp.	31-39	and	R.	W.	SCHMIDT,	The	Domain	of	Logic	According	
to	Saint	Thomas	Aquinas,	Den	Haag	1966,	pp.	150-156.	60	See	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	30,	p.	1,	a.	2,	ed.	Rome,	1596,	672aC,	ms.	Vat.	Borghese	 lat.	329,	323rb,	quoted	above,	note	40.	
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mean	that	in	cognition	a	relation	is	posited	from	an	ontological	point	of	view,	but	that	the	intellect,	when	 it	 thinks	of	 cognition,	 i.e.	when	 it	 has	 a	higher-order	 representation	of	cognition,	 “immediately,”	 through	 a	 “unique	 apprehension,”	 or	 “quasi	 imperceptibly,”	attributes	a	relation	to	cognition,	as	if	the	relation	came	“from	the	nature	of	the	thing”	or	as	if	it	was	“in	the	thing.”	Finally,	one	should	be	aware	of	an	important	difference	between,	on	the	one	hand,	relations	of	similarity	or	causality,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	relation	of	cognition	to	its	object:	relations	of	similarity	or	causality	are	only	attributed	to	something	when	some	other	 real	 thing	 with	 a	 specific	 feature	 exists,	 for	 example	 another	 white	 thing	 for	similarity	 or	 a	 passive	 thing	 for	 causality;	 by	 contrast,	 the	 relation	of	 cognition	 to	 the	object	is	attributed	to	cognition	independently	of	the	real	existence	of	something	else,	i.e.	cognition	can	be	directed	toward	non-existent	objects.	Thus,	the	relationality	that	Auriol	discusses	in	distinction	30	is	an	“internal	relationality”	to	the	object,	and	it	is	independent	of	the	way	things	hold	in	the	outer	world.61	To	be	sure,	Auriol	makes	a	subsequent	claim	concerning	cases	in	which	the	object	of	cognition	exists	in	reality,	i.e.	concerning	cases	in	which	cognition	is	veridical.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	as	Auriol	tells	us,	one	and	the	same	object	can	exist	with	two	different	modes	of	being:	one	intentional,	in	the	mind,	and	the	other	real,	in	the	outer	world.62	In	such	a	situation,	i.e.	when	the	object	that	is	thought	of	also	exists	in	the	outer	world,	cognition	is	not	only	grasped	as	a	“likeness”	of	the	object,	but	also	 as	 having	 a	 relation	 that	 expresses	 the	 veridicality	 of	 cognition,	 i.e.	 a	 relation	 of	“conformity”:		 […]	the	reality	of	 the	vision	does	not	require	the	real	presence	of	an	existing	object,	although	the	truth	of	a	vision	requires	this,	since	the	truth	adds	to	the	reality	of	a	vision	the	relationship	of	conformity	to	the	thing.63		However,	 this	 relation	 of	 “conformity”	 is	 not	 to	 be	 confused	 with	 the	 relation	 of	 the	measure	to	what	is	measured,	which	is	attributed	to	cognition	independently	of	the	real	existence	of	the	object.		 	61	I	thank	Russell	Friedman	for	his	suggestion	to	talk	here	of	an	“internal	relationality.”	62	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	d.	27,	p.	2,	a.	2,	ed.	R.	L.	FRIEDMAN,	18.645-648.	63	PETER	AURIOL,	Scriptum,	Prooemium,	q.	2,	a.	3,	n°	91,	ed.	E.	M.	BUYTAERT,	200.123-126,	transl.	C.	BOLYARD	–	R.	PASNAU,	slightly	modified:	“[...]	realitas	visionis	non	exigit	realem	praesentiam	obiecti	existentis,	quamvis	exigat	eam	veritas	visionis	pro	eo	quod	veritas	addit	super	realitatem	visionis	respectum	conformitatis	ad	rem.”		
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In	sum,	the	intellect,	when	it	thinks	of	created	cognition,	“immediately”	attributes	a	relation	 to	 it,	 as	 if	 the	 relation	 came	 “from	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 thing.”	 Cognition	 is	 not	represented	as	relational	because	something	else	is	related	to	it,	but	rather	because	of	its	intrinsic	 features.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 represented	 as	 relational	 independently	 of	 the	 real	existence	of	something	else,	i.e.	its	cognitive	relation	does	not	depend	on	the	real	existence	of	the	object	(although	it	may	also	have	an	additional	relation	of	conformity	to	the	object,	when	the	object	really	exists).	 In	brief,	every	time	the	 intellect	has	a	representation	of	cognition,	it	“immediately”	attributes	to	it	a	relation,	on	the	basis	of	the	intrinsic	features	of	cognition	and	independently	of	the	real	existence	of	the	object.	Thus,	for	Auriol,	created	cognition,	 understood	 as	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 cognitive	 power	 and	 a	 “likeness,”	 is	ontologically	absolute,	but	can	only	be	represented	(that	is,	can	only	be	thought	about	in	a	higher-order	representation)	as	having	a	relation	to	an	object.				4.	Conclusion		Auriol	 has	 a	 sophisticated	 theory	 of	 cognition.	 He	 holds	 that	 cognition	 is	 anything	 by	means	of	which	an	object	appears.	This	is	a	general	claim,	which	describes	cognition	in	an	indeterminate	 manner.	 However,	 when	 discussing	 the	 implementation	 of	 cognition,	Auriol	makes	a	distinction	between	God	and	creatures.	In	God,	cognition	is	just	the	deity	itself.	In	creatures,	things	are	more	complicated:	cognition	is	something	absolute,	more	precisely	a	composite	entity	made	up	of	a	cognitive	power	and	a	“likeness.”	Although	the	description	 of	 cognition	 as	 “that	 by	means	 of	which	 something	 appears”	 seems	 to	 be	relational,	 since	 it	 includes	 something	 plus	 an	 appearing	 object,	 Auriol	 is	 careful	 in	distinguishing	relative	and	connotative	concepts.	The	concept	of	cognition	is	connotative:	it	refers	directly	to	anything	which	makes	an	object	appear,	and	obliquely	to	the	object	as	appearing,	but	it	does	not	put	any	relation	in	the	direct	referent.	This	is	to	be	contrasted	with	a	relative	concept,	e.g.	father,	which	also	refers	directly	and	obliquely,	but	in	addition	puts	 a	 relation	 in	 its	 direct	 referent,	 e.g.	 paternity.	 Interestingly,	with	 the	 help	 of	 this	distinction,	Auriol	manages	to	account	for	the	view	that	cognition	entails	some	“object-givenness,”	 namely	 the	 apparition	 of	 an	 intentional	 object,	 but	 he	avoids	 positing	 any	relation	 to	 explain	 it,	 either	 real	 or	 conceptual.	 In	 other	 words,	 Auriol	 admits	 that	
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intentionality	implies	the	presence	of	an	object	“in	front	of”	the	cognizer,	but	shows	that	accounting	for	this	does	not	necessarily	require	a	relation.	However,	Auriol	also	holds	that	created	cognition,	since	it	is	made	up	of	a	“likeness”	of	the	object,	a	reproduction	or	a	copy,	entails	a	relation	to	the	object.	Yet,	this	additional	claim	does	not	 imply	 an	 ontological	 enrichment	 of	 cognition.	 Indeed,	 since	Auriol	 is	 a	conceptualist	about	relations,	when	he	holds	that	created	cognition	always	comes	with	a	relation,	 what	 he	 means,	 in	 the	 final	 analysis,	 is	 that	 created	 cognition	 can	 only	 be	
represented	(that	is,	can	only	be	thought	about	in	a	higher-order	representation)	as	having	a	 relation	 to	 its	 object.	 From	 an	 ontological	 point	 of	 view,	 created	 cognition	 remains	absolute.	As	for	God,	since	he	does	not	intelligize	with	reproductions	or	copies,	there	is	no	relation	to	be	posited	in	him	anyway.	To	be	sure,	Auriol’s	account	of	cognition	is	quite	complex,	mainly	due	to	his	twofold	division	into	divine	and	created	cognition,	which	each	have	their	own	structure.	However,	instead	of	criticizing	this	complexity,	one	could	also	try	to	exploit	it	by	distinguishing	in	Auriol	two	interesting	models	of	cognition,	one	which	allows	for	some	“object-givenness”	without	positing	any	relation,	real	or	conceptual,	and	another	one	which	allows	for	some	relationality,	but	by	positing	only	a	conceptual	relation.64	Both	these	models	would	seem	to	be	useful	in	contemporary	discussions	in	philosophy	of	mind,	more	precisely	in	defence	of	non-relational	accounts	of	intentionality.	Indeed,	in	recent	debate,	some	authors	reject	the	thesis	that	the	ontology	of	intentionality	is	relational.65	One	major	argument	against	the	relational	theory	of	intentionality	is	the	problem	of	non-existent	objects:	some	mental	acts	have	objects	that	do	not	exist;	relations	need	two	existing	relata;	thus,	mental	acts	are	not	relational.66	Now,	Auriol	furnishes	two	different	models	of	cognition	which	could	both	be	used	for	contemporary	purposes.	First,	cognition	can	be	treated	as	a	connotative	concept,	with	the	addition	of	no	relation	at	all,	either	real	or	conceptual.	This	would	be	the	“strong	non-relational	theory,”	based	on	Auriol’s	account	of	divine	cognition.	Second,	one	may	 like	 to	 allow	 for	 some	 relationality,	 in	 arguing	 that	 after	 all,	 the	 logical-linguistic	structure	of	intentionality	is	relational:	cognition	is	always	about	something.	In	that	case,	one	 could	 adapt	 Auriol’s	 account	 of	 created	 cognition,	 and	 say	 that	 intentionality	 is	
	64 	For	 a	 distinction	 of	 several	 “models	 of	 intentionality,”	 see	 D.	 PERLER,	Theorien	 der	 Intentionalität	 im	
Mittelalter,	esp.	pp.	1-30.		65	See	notably	U.	KRIEGEL,	The	Sources	of	Intentionality,	Oxford	2011,	e.g.	p.	154.	66	Note	that	this	is	one	of	the	reasons	that	has	motivated	Auriol	himself	to	reject	the	relational	account	of	cognition,	as	made	clear	by	the	texts	quoted	notes	10,	11,	44	and	46	above.		
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ontologically	absolute,	but	can	only	be	represented	as	having	a	relation	to	an	object.	This	would	be	the	“weak	non-relational	theory,”	which	would	admit	that	the	logical-linguistic	structure	of	intentionality	is	relational,	and	thus	that	we	think	of	it	as	a	relation,	but	that	our	 best	 ontological	 explanation	 of	 intentionality	 is	 non-relational.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 final	analysis,	the	complexity	of	Auriol’s	theory	of	cognition	may	be	seen	as	a	richness.67	 	Hamid	TAIEB	Department	of	Philosophy	(KGW)	University	of	Salzburg	Kapitelgasse	4-6	5020	Salzburg	Austria		hamid.taieb@sbg.ac.at	
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